Whatever else might be said about the current state of our financial markets, it’s safe to say that right now they are a mess.
How big a mess, how long it will take to clean up, and how dangerous the mess really is are all the subject of vigorous debate.
What we do know for sure is that the government officials in charge of trying to steer our economy are in a near panic—and that in and of itself should be enough to cause the rest of us to panic. In fact, it has caused the rest of us to panic.
What we should panic about, though? The underlying economic challenges, which may or may not be dire? Or the policy choices being made in Washington, which almost certainly will leave American taxpayers on the hook for billions in new obligations and completely rewrite the rules for finance in America?
It’s hard to say. After all, Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke are smart guys with the most information at their disposal, so it’s natural to defer to their judgment about just how bad things are right now.
But on the other hand, as government officials charged with attempting to manage the economy they have a natural inclination to seek government solutions to whatever problems they see the economy confronted by.
That’s a pretty dangerous inclination. Not only are Bernanke and Paulson recommending to Congress that $700 Billion—comfortably more than the entire defense budget of the United States—be placed into their hands to purchase assets of unknown worth with precious little oversight, but now Congress is getting into the act by rewriting the proposed legislation to include a number of populist reforms which could hobble Wall Street’s recovery.
Whatever the dangers facing our economy, it would be very safe to say that Washington’s actions up until now have harmed more than they have helped. Financial markets cannot abide panic, and panic is what Washington has given them. Treasury Secretary Paulson testified before Congress that the average American should be scared about what is happening on Wall Street, and President Bush’s actions have amplified people’s concerns over the credit crunch.
Who wouldn’t be panicked under such circumstances?
I would feel a lot more confidence in the recommendations being pushed by the Administration if the Fed and Treasury appeared to have been acting off a plan from the very beginning of this crisis. The wavering between bailouts for some, not for others, then the nationalization of AIG and now finally the prospect of an across-the-board bailout has undoubtedly created or worsened the fear that we see on Wall Street and Main Street.
Arnold Kling has written an essay arguing that the current talk of an across-the-board bailout may be the cause—not the cure—of the current seizure in the credit market. “The market could be clogged because the prospects for a bailout are destroying the motivation to sell mortgage securities. If you sell this week and take a big loss, you will look pretty stupid if there is a bailout next week where comparable securities fetch much higher prices.”
Washington needs to get its act together because whether we like it or not it is now the biggest player in the market. By intervening in the markets in an ad hoc fashion and now dithering, policymakers have created a perfect storm—panic in the markets and utter dependence upon non-market forces in Washington DC to impose order. Washington has declared it will act, and until it does nobody else will.
As usual, the most frightening words in the English language are “I am from the government and I am here to help you.” Unfortunately, given the mess that has been created at least partly by Washington, it seems that Washington is the only place left that help might arrive from.










The elephant, amok: Jammed signals, unchained greed and recklessness
September 28th, 2008 by Craig WestoverWhen cornered by the media early last week, U.S. Senate majority leader Harry Reid warned that a solution to the turmoil in the financial markets wouldn’t be forthcoming soon because, “No one knows what to do.” A few hours later, Reid and a collection of bureaucratic and congressional cognoscenti emerged from a closed-door meeting knowing exactly what to do – put taxpayers on the hook for Wall Street’s debt so bankers and brokers could take a balance sheet “mulligan.”
Many politicos and pundits portrayed the prospect of a free-market Republican administration advocating government intervention and virtual public ownership of major financial institutions as the Armageddon of unfettered capitalism and the resurrection of more activist government.
But increasing uncertainty about the details of the proposed bailout and efforts to expand its scope only reinforce the reality that there is no one solution to the crisis, only trade-offs. Government bureaucrats necessarily lack the knowledge required to decide what those trade-offs ought to be. That is knowledge a single group does not have and cannot ever have. It’s knowledge embedded in the market.
Like the six blind men who went to see the elephant, economists, pundits, politicians, war heroes, former community organizers and ex-small town mayors have been running their hands over the situation, and not unexpectedly, their assessments match the part they happen to be yanking on.
The inability at the highest levels of government to see the whole problem is the fundamental flaw with Washington’s economic mulligan. Policymakers may have a plan that fulfills the collective desire to “do something,” but Reid’s original assessment is still most astute – no one really knows what the whole problem is.
Any plan coming out of Washington is based on three dubious assumptions, taken for granted: that the gathered officials possess all relevant information; that their desired objectives are achievable; that they possess the authority to implement their plan.
Accepting those assumptions, policymakers approach the economic crisis as a complex puzzle. The truly believe that a bunch of really smart people can solve it, given enough money and the coercive power to guarantee compliance.
In his essay “The Use of Knowledge in Society” F.A. Hayek takes up the general case and notes that the economic problem of society does not have a strictly logical solution. As Hayek explains, “The reason for this is that the ‘data’ from which the economic calculus starts are never for the whole society ‘given’ to a single mind which could work out the implications and can never be so given.”
Paraphrasing Hayek’s general argument and applying it to the specific case, the financial crisis facing our elected and unelected officials is not simply a problem of how to “adjust” existing market factors to preserve the financial system when “adjustment” assumes that all relevant information is available to those crafting the plan. Rather, the problem is how to facilitate the most effective adjustments in the economy to the benefit of any member of society, “for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know.”
Policymakers are laboring under the misconception that government can somehow come up with a solution that will simultaneously punish the wicked, reward the righteous, leave the ignorant blissfully blameless and the rest of us financially intact. The reality is that objective is unobtainable; there is no one solution, only trade-offs. And right now armies of lobbyists are clashing on Capitol Hill over just what those trade-offs are going to be and who will impose them on the rest of us.
When battle ends, bodies will be buried and poppies planted and victory declared for a “solution” that serves visible collective ends but has only serendipitous connection to the unseen ends important to any individual, of which no bureaucratic planner can ever have complete and timely knowledge, empathy or concern.
We don’t need better policy for management and oversight of the financial markets. We do need policy that better facilitates dispersing economic knowledge to those making everyday economic decisions. From the creation of Fannie Mae to passage of the Community Reinvestment Act, government interventions have jammed the economic signals that the market needs to function effectively. Government policy has created moral hazard that breaks the bonds of market discipline and unchains greed and recklessness. We may be blind to the whole cause of the current economic crisis, but government intervention is the elephant in the room.
Craig Westover is a contributing columnist to the Pioneer Press Opinion Page and a senior policy fellow at the Minnesota Free Market Institute (www.mnfmi.org). His e-mail address is westover4@yahoo.com This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .
This column originally appeared in the St. Paul Pioneer Press, September 25, 2008. See also “The Elephant in the Room” at the Center for the American Experiment.
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